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NPT, Where Art Thou? The Nonproliferation Treaty
and Bargaining: Iran as a Case Study
Amir Azaran*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two years, the world has witnessed two significant nuclear
proliferation problems unfold. In early 2003 North Korea withdrew from the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons' ("NPT")-the legal
instrument that occupies center stage in the international nonproliferation
regime-and later admitted to manufacturing nuclear weapons.2 Iran poses a
different kind of problem. On the one hand, Iran remains a signatory to the
NPT, claims that its pursuit of nuclear technology is for peaceful purposes only,
and-after some deception-appears to have substantiated its claim by
submitting to intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities.3 On the other hand,
since its revolution in 1979, Iran has been governed by religious clergymen
prone to putting ideology ahead of national interests and generally has been
hostile to the interests of the United States. It has also been linked to terrorist
activity4 and has acquired advanced ballistic missile technology from North
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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970), 21 UST 483 (hereinafter NPT).
James Brooke and David E. Sanger, North Koreans Say They Hold Nuclear Arms, NY Times A16
(Feb 11, 2005).

2

3

Nazila Fathi, Citing Peaceful Uses, Iran Leader Asserts Right to Nuclear Program, NY Times § 1 at 6
(Aug 29, 2004). See also International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Dr. Mohamed
ElBaradei, Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (Nov 25, 2004), available online at
(visited Feb 22,
<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004nOl6.html>
2005). For details of iran's deceptve tactics with regard to its nuclear facilities, see generally James
Traub, The Netheiworld of Nonproliferation, NY Times § 6 at 49 (June 13, 2004).
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Hossein Alikhani, SanctioningIran: Anatomy of a FailedPolig 402-06 (1B Tauris 2000).
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Korea (and perhaps China).5 Furthermore, in the wake of Iran's brutal war with
Iraq in the 1980s, high-ranking Iranian officials indicated that the acquisition of
nuclear weapons is consistent with Iranian security needs.6
Given Iran's more troublesome attributes, Europe and the United States
wish to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons and following in North
Korea's footsteps. The Western democracies are particularly worried about
Iran's nuclear ambitions because it seeks to control the nuclear fuel cycle'-the
process used to convert uranium ore into enriched uranium and, after using the
enriched uranium as fuel in a nuclear reactor, to reprocess the spent fuel in order
to extract the unconsumed portion of uranium.8 The Iranian government claims
that it wants to enrich uranium only for its civilian nuclear reactors and for
research purposes,9 and correctly asserts that this right is granted by the NPT.
Control of the fuel cycle, however, makes it easier for a state to pursue a
clandestine nuclear weapons program and makes it more difficult for other
countries to "coerc[e] or influenc[e]" that state through supply-side
disincentives. 10 Thus, the Western democracies are left with a choice between
relying on the NPT's nonproliferation regime, allowing Iran to control the
fuel cycle, or somehow forcing or convincing Iran to forego its legal right to
enrich uranium.
Relying solely on the current nonproliferation regime may be undesirable.
The NPT and the associated safeguards system created by the International
Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") make it more costly for a state to develop a
clandestine nuclear program, but a country like Iran may be willing to incur this
5

6

Martin Navias, Proliferationin the Middle East and the North Asian Connection, in William M. Evan and
Ved P. Nanda, eds, Nuclear Proliferationand the Legaly ofNuclear Weapons 69, 75 (University Press of
America 1995).
Haleh Vaziri, Iran'sNuclearQuest:Moivationsand Consequences, in Raju G.C. Thomas, ed, The Nuclear
Non-ProliferationRegime: Prospectsfor the 21st Century 310, 316-17 (MacMillan 1998).

7

Stephen Fidler, Roula Khalaf, and Gareth Smyth, Doubts Persistover Tehran's True Intentions regarding
Its Nuclear Programme, Fin Times 17 (Sept 9, 2004) (quoting a member of Iran's parliament stating
that "the ILAEA has now had time to verify Iran's position, and we can now insist on our right to
enrich uranium.'.

8

Ann Hessing Cahn, Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran, in Onkar Marwah and Ann
Schulz, eds, Nuclear Proiferationand the Near-NuclearCountries185, 187-189 (Balinger 1975).

9

Fathi, CitingPeaceful Uses, NY Times § 1 at 6 (cited in note 3).
Cahn, Determinantsof the Nuclear Option at 189 (cited in note 8). The nuclear fuel cycle provides two
avenues for acquiring weapons-grade material: plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. As Cahn
points out, it is much easier to chemically separate weapons-grade plutonium from spent nuclear
fuel than it is to create highly-enriched uranium in the first instance. Thus, "[i]f a nation wishes to
pursue a nuclear option it is clear that it will seek self-sufficiency with respect to all steps of the
nuclear fuel cycle," for example, the reprocessing of spent fuel. Id. For a good summary of the
technical issues, see Richard L. Williamson Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation
Regime to Impede Advanced Proliferation,28 Cornell Ind L J 71, 77-82 (1995).
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cost in exchange for greater security, regional influence, or national prestige."
The same country also may wish to develop civilian nuclear power for legitimate
economic reasons. Iran, for example, may seek to reduce the opportunity cost of
consuming its oil and natural gas domestically-as opposed to exporting themin order to meet its rising energy demand. 12 Iran also may wish to develop a
robust civilian nuclear sector to diversify and modernize its economy and
provide jobs for its rapidly growing workforce. 3
In this Development, I argue that the NPT cannot effectively deter
nonproliferation on its own terms, nor can it do so by virtue of establishing a
"nonproliferation norm.' ' 14 Instead, because of its broad language, the security
uncertainties characteristic of the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape, and the
desire of nuclear weapon states to maintain their monopoly, the NPT is able to
deter nuclear proliferation only insofar as it encourages bargaining between
"threshold states"'" and more powerful countries dissatisfied with the NPT's

11

12

There is much debate in the political science literature regarding the causes of nuclear
proliferation. One school embraces only national security as a cause and rejects other "nonrealist"
notions like national prestige. See, for example, Bradley A. Thayer, The Causes of NuclearProferation
and the Utiiy of the Non-ProliferationRegime, in Thomas, ed, The Nuclear Non-ProlierationRegime 75,
76, 99-101 (cited in note 6). Other scholars believe there is a more complex set of causes. See, for
example, Scott D. Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb, 21
Intl Security 54 (Winter 1996-1997) (exploring causes other than national security, such as
domestic politics and national identity).
See Akbar Etemad, Iran, in Harald Miller, ed, A European Non-Proliferaion Po'y 203, 209-10

(Oxford 1987) (stating that before Iran's 1979 revolution, the Iranian government had concluded
that reliance on nuclear power generation was necessary to meet the country's rapidly expanding
energy needs). Etemad also states that despite its postrevolution economic depression, Iran's
expanding population and rural electrification efforts have maintained a high demand for "energy
of all kinds." See also Iran to Increase Electriciy Capadc'y y 3,000 Megawatts, Persian Journal (Nov 24,
2004), available online at <http://www.iranian.ws/iran-news/publish/article_4606.shtml>
(visited Feb 22, 2005) (stating that Iran currently imports more electricity than it exports).
13 Interview with Joseph Cirincione, Senior Associate and Director, Non-Proliferation Project,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Chicago Public Radio's Worldview program (Nov
19, 2004), audio file available online at <http://www.chicagopubhlicradio.org/audiolibrary/
wvranov04.asp#l 9> (visited Jan 22, 2005) (stating that Iran believes it would gain an "economic
benefit" if it controlled the entire fuel cycle).
14 John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, The Future of the Non-Prokferation Treaty: An Oveniew, in John
Simpson and Darryl Howlett, eds, The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 3, 4-5 (St. Martin's 1995)
(stating that the NPT "has provided a normative basis" for the nonproliferation regime, thereby
creating an international norm of nonproliferation); Lawrence Scheinman, Does the NPT Matter?,
in Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds, Beyond 1995: The Future of the NPT Regime 53, 56-57
(Plenum 1990).
is
The phrase "threshold state" has been used to describe countries that are within reach of the
tcchnological means to develop nuclear weapons and that must decide whether or not to
accelerate or abandon their programs. See, for example, Shibashis Chatterjee, Nuclear NonProfiferationand the Problem of Threshold States 16-17 (Minerva 1999).
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default rule of allowing uranium enrichment. In other words, the NPT's
effectiveness does not lie in its legal prohibition on nuclear weapon
development; rather, its effectiveness stems from providing a broad baseline
against which states can bargain. 6 Section II provides a background on the
nonproliferation framework under the NPT and examines why it enables
bargaining. Section III highlights Iran's particular case and some probable
characteristics of states willing to attempt this type of bargaining. A brief
conclusion follows in Section IV.
II. THE NPT's NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
The NPT is generally regarded as the centerpiece of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime-the main instrument of international law aimed at
controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. 7 Originally set to expire after twentyfive years, in 1995 the signatories to the NPT approved its indefinite renewal. 8
Its central aim is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to states that did not
possess them at the time of its inception, while also allowing those states to
enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. The goal of giving countries access
to nuclear energy in exchange for placement of their nuclear programs under a
system of international inspection is sometimes termed the "grand bargain" of
the NPT. 9
A. THE NPT's LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The NPT creates two separate categories of nations: nuclear weapon
states-countries that "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967" 2 -and nonnuclear weapon
states. Under Articles I and II of the treaty, nuclear weapon states agree not to
transfer or assist in the development of "nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices," and nonnuclear weapon states agree not to receive or seek

19

It is worth mentioning here that this Development is intended as a positive account of how the
NPT seems to be operating in today's world, and is not intended as a normative stance on the
NPT's soundness as an instrument of international law.
There are several other bilateral and regional security agreements that fall within the
nonproliferation regime. For a concise summary, see Williamson, 28 Cornell Ind L J at 118-21
(cited in note 10).
NPT, art X, 2 (cited in note 1); Jon L. Woodard, InternationalLegal Frameworks Relating to China's
Nuclear Exports to Iran: Safeguarding the Transfer of Dual-Use Nuclear Technology, 25 NC J Ind L &
Comm Reg 359, 365 (2000).
Traub, The Netherworld of Nonproliferation, NY Times § 6 at 49 (cited in note 3).

20

NPT, art IX,

16

17

18

3 (cited in note 1).
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the same.21 Article III compels nonnuclear weapon states to enter into a
subsidiary agreement with the IAEA, accepting the latter's safeguards system for
"the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
assumed under" the NPT to prevent "diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
,,2
uses to nuclear weapons. In exchange, Article IV of the NPT provides that
nonnuclear weapon states are granted the "inalienable right . . . to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination." 23 It is this text in Article IV that grants nonnuclear weapon
states the right to control the nuclear fuel cycle. The NPT also contains an exit
provision; under Article X a nonnuclear weapon state, with three months notice
to the other parties, can exit the treaty if "extraordinary events" jeopardize that
state's "supreme interests. 24
As noted, the IAEA is the agency empowered by the NPT to establish and
apply safeguard mechanisms. It seeks to accomplish the NPT's twin aims of
preventing the diversion of peaceful nuclear energy to the production of nuclear
weapons and providing assistance for the development of peaceful nuclear
technology. 25 To fulfill its requirement of accepting IAEA safeguards, a
nonnuclear weapon state must complete negotiations with the IAEA within two
years of ratifying the NPT.26 The result of the negotiations is a detailed
agreement typically requiring the nonnuclear weapon state to establish an
accounting system for various types of nuclear material27 and to inform the
agency about any nuclear facilities.28 The agreement also establishes the process
and scope of inspections.29 If a nonnuclear weapon state violates its agreement
21

Id, arts I, II.

22

Id, art III,

23

Id, art IV, 1.

24

Id, art X,

25

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1957), 8 UST 1093, arts II, III(A)(1)-(5),
XI(A)(3)-(4), XI(A)(6) (hereinafter IAEA Statute).
NPT, art III, 4 (cited in note 1).

26
27

28
29

1, 2.

1.

See, for example, International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular, The Text of the
Agreement between Iran and the Agen-y for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc No INFCIRC/214 (Dec 13, 1974), arts 7, 32-38,
at
<htrp://www.iaea.org/Pubfications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/
online
available
infcirc2l4.pdf> (visited Feb 22, 2005).
Id, arts 42-49.
Id, arts 70-82. A country may also agree to the IAEA's "Additional Protocol," which details more
intrusive inspection practices. See Model ProtocolAdditional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the
InternationalAtomic Energy Agenq for the Application of Safeguards, IAEA Doc No INFCIRC!540,
<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/
at
online
available
1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf> (visited Feb 22, 2005). Iran has signed the Additional Protocol.
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc No
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with the IAEA-by not disclosing the quantities of nuclear material or the
location of nuclear facilities, for example-the agency can refer the matter to the
Council, which in turn may impose sanctions on the violating
UN Security
30
country.

B. THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME IN TODAY'S WORLD
Most commentators consider the NPT to be an overall success. 31 Recent
proliferation problems have sparked fresh criticism, however.3 2 With regard to
the problem of threshold states, three features of the NPT's nonproliferation
regime are of particular relevance. The first concerns the NPT's broad language,
and is well stated by Rathjens:
Nothing in the [NPT] prohibits a state from developing indigenous
capacities for the production of fissionable materials or producing and
stockpiling such materials or other components that might be used in
nuclear weapons. These lacunae are particularly troublesome because the
development of facilities for uranium enrichment and spent fuel processing
... can be rationalized, albeit with greatly varying degrees of credibility, as
33
being consistent with non-military nuclear power aspirations.
Rathjens captures the inherent tension in the NPT: by allowing indigenous
production capabilities, including control of the fuel cycle, the NPT allows
nonnuclear weapon states to reach the brink of developing nuclear weapons
while still operating within their treaty obligations. A country can therefore
legitimately stockpile nuclear material, withdraw from the NPT using the Article
X exit provision, and declare itself a nuclear power. 34

30

GOV/2004/90
3 (Nov 29, 2004), available online at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-90_derestrict.pdf> (visited Feb 12, 2005).
IAEA Statute, art XII(C) (cited in note 25).

31

See, for example, Williamson, 28 Cornell Ind L J at 122-28 (cited in note 10); David Sloss, It's Not

32

Broken, So Don't Fix It: The InternationalAtomic Energy Agenfy Safeguards System and the Nuclear
Nonproferation TreaLy, 35 Va J Ind L 841, 845 (1995) (refuting criticisms that the IAEA safeguards
system lacks robustness); Simpson and Howlett, The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at 4-5
(cited in note 14).
See, for example, Woodard, 25 NC J Intl L & Comm Reg at 368 (cited in note 18) (arguing that
the current safeguards system is limited because a given technology can serve both civilian and
military purposes); Traub, The Netbenworld of Nonproliferation,NY Times § 6 at 49 (cited in note 3)
(stating that "the bargain enshrined in the [NPT] . . . is effectively defunct" because the
"threshold issue" in nonproliferation is uranium enrichment); Fidler, Khalaf, and Smyth, Doubts
Persist over Tebran's True Intentions, Fin Times at 17 (cited in note 7) (stating that diplomats consider
"the permission to enrich for peaceful purposes ... as an inherent weakness" in the NPT).

33

George Rathjens, Nuclear Prohferaion Following the NPT Extension, in Thomas, ed, The NuclearNonProlferation Regime 25, 26-27 (cited in note 6).

34

Id at 27.

Vol 6 No. 1

NVPT, WhbereArt Thou?

A:Zaran

Second, the NPT's perceived successes must be analyzed in the post-Cold
War context. During "their worldwide competition for influence," the United
States and the Soviet Union entered into security arrangements with many
countries, which in turn reduced the incentive for those countries to pursue
nuclear weapons.3" This "bipolarity" ended with the Cold War, making security
arrangements in various regions more uncertain. Uncertainty with regard to
security, in turn, will probably lead a greater number of states to conclude that
nuclear weapons are consistent with their security interests-such weapons will
be perceived as a way to ensure security and regional influence "in an anarchic
world."36
Third, some view the NPT not as a global effort to halt the spread of
nuclear weapons for the good of humanity, but as a tool of the nuclear "haves"
to maintain their monopoly on nuclear weapons. 3 In other words, nuclear
weapon states desire nonproliferation not for its own sake, but also to ensure
their own security and military superiority by being the only states legally allowed
to possess nuclear weapons. 38 It follows that the nuclear weapon states have
more at stake with respect to nonproliferation than do nonnuclear weapon
states. Therefore, it is unlikely that nuclear weapon states will submit to the
NPT's default rule of allowing uranium enrichment by nonnuclear weapon
states.
These three features-the NPT's broad language, uncertainties regarding
security in the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape, and the nuclear weapon
states' self-interest-allow countries to bargain their right to enrich uranium
under the NPT in exchange for more favorable economic or security
arrangements. This "bargaining option" is available to countries that have no
interest in ultimately developing nuclear weapons, and it allows countries to
avoid the negative diplomatic consequences and possible sanctions associated
with outright withdrawal from the NPT. Iran, whether or not it eventually seeks
to develop nuclear weapons, seems to be pursuing the bargaining option with
some degree of success."
35

Id.

36

Thayer, The Causes offNucear Prolferationat 78 (cited in note 11).

37

Id at 103. See also Daniel I. Okimoto, Japan'sNon-Nuclear Poliy: The Problem of the NPT, 15 Asian
Survey 313, 315 (1975) (stating that Japan delayed signing the NPT partially because it perceived
"a joint US-USSR desire to freeze the world's military status quo" and that the NPT's ultimate

38

39

aim was "the perpetuation of the present structure of superpower hegemony.").
Thayer, The Causes of NuclearProliferationat 112 (cited in note 11).
Currently, Iran is in talks with France, Germany, and the UK (by way of an IAEA steering
committee) to determine a final incentives package in return for Iran halting all uranium
enrichment activity. IAEA Press Release, Iran-EUAgreement on NuclearProgramme (Nov 14, 2004),
available online at <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/eu_iranl4ll2004.shtml>
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III. WHAT KINDS OF STATES WILL BARGAIN NPT RIGHTS?
Are the security uncertainties resulting from the end of Cold War-era
bipolarity, by themselves, enough to ensure that more threshold states are on the
horizon? Probably not, although shifting alliances and continuing regional
instabilities weigh heavily in favor of this proposition. Iran's case is instructive,
however, because it illustrates other characteristics that are typical of a country
able to use its NPT enrichment rights to pressure nuclear weapon states to
bargain. These attributes may prove useful in predicting whether a country will
be motivated to engage in enrichment bargaining.
First, the threshold state will not merely have security concerns, but it will
have legitimate security concerns coupled with a concurrent need to grow its
economy. This is a straightforward consequence of cost justification-in order
to trade NPT enrichment rights, a state must acquire the means to enrich. This
includes specialized technology and trained personnel, and is very costly. If a
state undertakes this enterprise for the sole purpose of trading NPT rights for
economic incentives and the bargain never materializes, the costs would far
exceed the benefits of domestic enrichment capabilities. On the other hand, if
the state also is in a precarious security position, enrichment technology gives it
the ability to create nuclear weapons. This is a large benefit because it can be
realized without actual weapons production; merely having the capability to
build nuclear weapons may tip the geopolitical scales in the state's favor.
Iran meets this first criterion. While it has large oil and natural gas reserves,
its economy was decimated during its eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s. At
the end of the war, a population boom doubled Iran's size from 35 million in
197940 to nearly 70 million today.41 As a result, 70 percent of Iran's citizens are
under the age of thirty,4 2 creating a great need for job growth. In addition to its
(visited Feb 22, 2005). Meanwhile, US policy objectives remain somewhat ambiguous. On the one
hand, the US has agreed to support "limited" incentives-including allowing the sale of spare
aircraft parts to Iran and dropping its objections to Iran's efforts at joining the WTO-in return
for the Europeans' commitment to refer Iran to the UN Security Council should it resume
enrichment. Carla A. Robbins, US to Back Incentives ForIran to Shift Course, Wall St J A12 (Mar 11,
2005). On the other hand, there are reports of secret US reconnaissance missions in Iran intended
to yield targets for possible military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. See Seymour M.
Hersh, The Coming Wars: What the Pentagon Can Now Do in Secret, The New Yorker 40, 42-43 (an
24, 2005). Indeed, in attempting to provide a "stick" to go along with the Europeans' "carrot,"
the ambiguous US approach is not wholly inconsistent, and is in itself part of the
bargaining process.
41

Etemad, Iran at 210 (cited in note 12).
Index Mundi, Iran Population, available

42

population.html> (visited Feb 22, 2005).
Miranda Eeles, Iran's Youth Seek Future Overseas, BBC News (May 29, 2003), available online at

40

online

at

<http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/2946982.stm> (visited Feb 22, 2005).

Vol. 6 No. 1

N-PT, Where Art Thou?

A Zaran

economic needs, Iran's security situation is precarious; it is surrounded by four
of the world's eight nuclear powers-Pakistan and India to the east, Russia to
the North, and Israel to the west.43 Further, Iran is made nervous by the
substantial presence of the United States military in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran's
direct neighbors to the east and west.
Moreover, a threshold state probably will be at odds politically with the
Western democracies. This is related to the first characteristic-it is the Western
democracies that, for the most part, can provide the economic concessions and
security guarantees that would cost justify the entire enterprise. A country
seeking a more favorable economic position or a better security arrangement
presumably would pursue such goals using diplomatic channels if possible, since
diplomacy is far less costly than trading uranium enrichment rights.
Furthermore, acquiring the means to enrich uranium carries with it adverse
diplomatic consequences because the state will be criticized for wishing to "go
nuclear." While this reputation cost will be less for a state with favorable
relations with the West (those with good relations are less likely to criticize each
other diplomatically), it nevertheless weighs against a state resorting to
bargaining enrichment rights if it has other means of bargaining available.
Iran is a good example of such a state. Its revolution in 1979 resulted in the
overthrow of a monarchy, the establishment of a quasi-democracy framed within
an Islamic theocracy, and the end of any meaningful diplomatic relations with its
one-time ally, the United States. A series of diplomatic and foreign policy
missteps by both sides, both at the time of the Iranian revolution and
afterwards, have further damaged an alliance of strategic importance to both
countries. 44 In addition, Iran's poor foreign policy choices throughout the
1980s, 45 coupled with the United States' influence in discouraging other nations
from dealing with Iran, resulted in Iran's relatively poor relations with other
industrialized nations. Iran has been active in repairing its diplomatic relations
with Europe in the last several years, but only the United States can provide the
security guarantees that Iran seeks.46

43

Arnaud de Borchgrave, Tough NuclearNeighborhood,Wash Times (Oct 27, 2004), available online at
(visited Feb 22,
<http://washingtontimes.com/commentary/20041026-090659-7596r.htm>
2005). It should be noted that Pakistan, India, and Israel are not signatories to the NPT, so they
are not "nuclear weapon states" as the term is defined within the NPT.

44

See James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-IranianRelations 1-7 (Yale 1988).

45

Including, for example, Iran's promise to export its 1979 revolution to the entire Muslim world,
and the order issued by Iran's former supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, calling for the
a~sassination of author Saiman Rushoe.

46

Interview with Joseph Cirincione (cited in note 13) (stating that the key to any deal with Iran is
US approval, since "only the US can provide the security guarantees that Iran wants").
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The attributes mentioned thus far-the concurrent need for both
economic growth and a better security arrangement, along with unfavorable
relations with the Western democracies-are also true of North Korea. Thus
one might ask why Iran and North Korea pose different problems, as I initially
claimed. From the point of view of the United States, the two pose radically
different diplomatic problems because North Korea has nuclear weapons and
Iran does not (yet). From another point of view, North Korea and Iran are
different only insofar as they weighed differently the relative benefits of security
and economic incentives. In other words, North Korea found the benefits of
security to outweigh the probable economic or security incentives provided by
the United States, whereas Iran seems to have placed a greater emphasis on
economic incentives, at least for the moment.
IV. CONCLUSION
By virtue of the IAEA safeguards system, the nonproliferation regime
established by the NPT is intricate and makes it costly for a nonnuclear weapon
state to successfully cheat by establishing a clandestine nuclear weapons
program. The NPT's broad language, however, gives countries the legal right to
enrich and reprocess uranium for peaceful purposes. This default rule is
unfortunate for countries that wish to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation
because enrichment technology can be easily used to manufacture nuclear
weapons, and some countries are willing to incur the costs of cheating.
Furthermore, some countries may use the threat of cheating to bargain for
economic and security concessions from wealthier nations that wish to maintain
the nuclear status quo.
Solely criticizing the broad language of the NPT is tempting, but doing so
places too much emphasis on the normative value of nonproliferation and too
little emphasis on states' self-interest. Such criticism also suffers from hindsight
bias; as a matter of political reality, the NPT would have enjoyed little credibility
had it sought to restrict the right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. This
would have been seen as an attempt by the nuclear weapon states to retain a
monopoly on all nuclear technology and would have discouraged countries from
signing the NPT in the first place.
Conceptualizing the issue as one of bargaining, however, better captures
the true state of affairs-states can contract around legal rights that they have
acquired through multilateral agreements. Under this view, the NPT does not
serve to establish legal norms, but rather gives parties a baseline from which to
bargain. Further, regional security uncertainties resulting from the Cold War's
end will spur more countries to capitalize on their NPT rights because uranium
enrichment will either provide security or enable them to negotiate for better
economic and security terms. Therefore, bargaining with threshold states is likely
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to increase over time. This is not necessarily bad-providing economic and
security incentives in exchange for nonproliferation may be more effective than
solely relying on multilateral treaty regimes.4" Of course, the success of
bargaining between states is a matter of politics, not law; thus the sustainability
of a nonproliferation bargaining regime will ultimately depend on how much it is
valued by political leaders.

47

David A. Koplow and Philip G. Schrag, Carying a Big Carrot:linking MultilateralDisarmament and
Development Assistance, 91 Colum L Rev 993, 994 (1991) ("In short, the wealthy countries, which
stand to benefit the most from the establishment of a more stable international military
environment, should be willing to pay for it.").
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